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An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different
panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility
model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates
indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of
lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have
previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are
estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal










Arbitration is a rapidly-growing method for resolving disputes. It is
used widely in the U.S. to resolve private disputes arising undercollective
bargaining agreements and commercial contracts, to resolve certain types of
civil disputes, and to set wages in the public sector-.Although arbitration
has been applied in a wide range of settings and takesnumerous forms, the
central feature of virtually all arbitration mechanisms is thatthey involve a
third party, i.e., an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators,hearing and deciding
how a dispute is to be resolved. In this respect, arbitrationmay be viewed
as a private sector analog to the court system with arbitrators performing
similar functions to judges. Arbitration tends, however, to bea cheaper,
quicker, and less formal method of dispute resolution than the courtsystem.
Arbitration systems also tend to provide disputing parties withgreater
latitude -in choosing "judges" (i.e., arbitrators) than do court systems.1
Among persons who are regularly involved in arbitration, it is generally
accepted that "good arbitrators" are the key to "good arbitration.." However,
there seems to be far less consensus about the meaning of the phrase"good
arbitrators." For example, is a good arbitrator someone who favorsyour side
or someone who is painstakingly fair in arriving at a decision? Is it someone
who has extensive experience with the type of dispute at handor someone with
good common sense and the ability to analyze, interpret, and judge? Is it
someone who tries to appease the parties by splitting decisions or someone who
strictly "calls them as he or she sees them?"
Our purpose in this paper is to address these and other related questions
by presenting an empirical analysis of the selection of arbitrators. We do
this by analyzing a remarkable set of data on the preferences of unions and
employers for different arbitrators under New Jersey's Fire and Police—2-
ArbitrationLaw.Accordingto this law, disputes over terms and conditions of
employment involving New Jersey's organized public safety employeesand the
governments that employ them must be resolved byarbitration. Arbitrators,
whose awards are binding by law, are chosen by the bargainersfrom a roster of
roughly seventy names maintained by the New Jersey Public EmploymentRelations
Commission (PERC). In cases in which the bargainers are unable to negotiate
an agreement, PERC circulates a list of seven arbitratorsand their resumes to
the parties, each of which is instructed to veto three names and to rank,in
order of their preferences, the remaining four names. PERC then appoints as
arbitrator the individual who was not vetoed by either side and whosecombined
rank is highest; rank ties are broken randomly by PERC.
Using information on employer and union rankings of different panelsof
arbitrators, along with information on the characteristics of the arbitrators,
we attempt to provide direct evidence on the followingthree issues:
(1) How similar are the preferences of unions and employerswith respect
to a given panel of arbitrators?
(2) What characteristics of arbitrators do unions and employersfind
desirable or undesirable? Do the unions and employers attach the same
or different weights to specific characteristics? and
(3) Do unions or employers engage in strategic behavior -inranking
arbitrators?
In proceeding this way, we also hope to shed light on three broader
issues. First, there has recently developed in the academic literature a body
of theoretical work on the subject of bargaining andarbitration.2 The basic
premise of most of this work is that arbitration is simply amechanism for
distributing income between conflicting interests. In contrast,institutional
economists and labor practitioners place greater emphasis on arbitration as a
mechanism for helping disputants identify and reach efficient outcomes. In
their view, arbitrators are professional gatherers and processors of information—3--
who play a highly constructive role -in a bargainingprocess which is better
treated as a cooperative attempt at problem-solving thanas direct economic
conflict. By analyzing the similarity of union andemployer preferences for
individual arbitrators and for different arbitratorcharacteristics, we suspect
that much can be learned about the general issue of whethercollective
bargaining is primarily an institution of cooperation or conflict.
Second, one of the most important characteristics of arbitrationsystems
is that they may be designed in differentways. Indeed, one key dimension in
which arbitration systems differ involves the mechanism forselecting the
arbitrator. Most mechanisms take account of the parties'preferences, either
through a rank-four/veto-three system like New Jersey's, or byallowing each
party to successively veto a name from an odd-numbered list of three ormore
arbitrators. Other arbitration systems appoint arbitratorson a purely rotating
basis from a list agreed to in advance by potential disputantsor established by
a third party such as the state. A final system involves theappointment of a
single individual or panel of individuals to arbitrate all disputesinvolving a
particular set of parties and arising in a specified period of time. Thekey
feature of all of these systems is that they guarantee theappointment of an
arbitrator without requiring explicit agreement (or even face-to-facecontact)
by two parties who are unable to reach agreement on some other (substantive)
matter. In addition, these systems all prescreen individuals beforethey are
added to the master list of eligible arbitrators. However, the firsttwo
systems provide for an additional level of screening by the parties prior to the
appointment of an arbitrator to hear a particular case. This additional level
of screening -is said to contribute to the legitimacy of the arbitrator andhis
award in the eyes of the parties. However, it can also contribute todelays in
the arbitration process, which is one of the most frequently citedcomplaints-4-
about arbitration. Thus, -it -is -interesting to ask whetherthe appointment of
arbitrators can be left entirely in the hands of the state or someimpartial
organization like the American Arbitration Association orwhether it is
important to take account of the parties' preferences on acase-by-case basis.
We will address this question below when we analyze the strengthof union and
employer preferences for different members of a setof "prescreened"
arbitrators .3
Third, our study raises important questions about the possibilityof stra-
tegic behavior and its treatment in empirical analysis.In particular, it is
well known that the outcomes of voting mechanisms can often be manipulated by
the strategic misrepresentation of preferences. Although it isnatural to
address this problem by directly estimating a structural modelof the underlying
economic game, the complexity and dimensionality of the game mayrender this
approach infeasible, as it does in our case. Thus, we develop someindirect
tests that we think will let us "back our way" into strategicbehavior if it is
there. We suspect that the type of indirect approach we propose maybe useful
in a variety of game-theoretic settings in which the games are too complicated
to solve.
In the next section of the paper we provide some institutional background
on the selection of arbitrators and describe our data.In Section III we set
out a simple random utility model that we use to represent the preferencesof
employers and unions for arbitrators with differentcharacteristics. We also
present the likelihood function we maximize to estimatethe parameters of this
model.4 In Section IV we present a descriptive summary of the data. We also
present estimates of the econometric model as well as twoalternative models we
estimate to test for the presence of strategic behavior. Section Vsummarizes
and concludes the paper.—5--
II. Institutional Background
Most of the data analyzed in this paper were drawn from the PERC'sarb-itra--
tiori records. First, we collected information on the lists ofarbitrators sent
by PERC to disputing parties along with the preference rankings returned toPERC
by the parties. We focused only on cases involving 1980 contractnegotiations.
That was the third year of operation of the New Jersey arbitrationsystem and
the third (and final) year in which PERC used its originalmaster list of eli-
gible arbitrators to form panels.5 Thus, we felt that by 1980 theparties had
reasonably good information about the arbitrators on which to base theirpre-
ference rankings. In many cases, at least one of theparties did not strictly
follow PERC's request for a preference ranking. Sometimesparties ranked more
than four names on the list; other times the parties vetoedmore than three
names; in a few cases a party responded to PERC by saying that all seven names
were equally acceptable; there were also a number of cases in which aparty
either failed to express its preferences to PERC or itspreferences were simply
not recorded in the PERC records.6 Altogether we collected informationon 193
arbitration panels. Of these, 75 are perfect in the sense that bothparties
ranked four names and vetoed three names. It should also be noted thatmany
(indeed, most) of the cases for which PERC circulated arbitrationpanels did not
end up being arbitrated. In other words,many disputants were able to reach
voluntary settlements after the arbitration panel was circulated but beforea
binding arbitration award was rendered. This characteristic of the
bargaining/arbitration process in New Jersey explains why some parties did not
report their arbitrator preferences to PERC (i.e., either their case was settled
before the due date for reporting their preferences orthey expected that it
would not end up in arbitration).—6-
Second, we collected information on the characteristics of the 69
arbitrators on PERC's master list. This information was derived from a variety
of sources including PERC's 1978 and 1979 interest arbitration recordsand
awards, PERC's 1979 grievance arbitration records, and the arbitrators' resumes.
In collecting this background information, we were guided by theinstitutional
literature on the relevant characteristics of arbitrators and by conversations
with labor relations practitioners.7 Roughly speaking, the relevant character-
istics of arbitrators seem to fall into four categories: (1) impartiality,
(2) consistency, (3) training, and (4) experience.8
Impartiality refers to an arbitrator's lack of predisposition torule in
favor of one side or another. This characteristic -is usually judged by
considering an arbitrator's prior decisions. It appears to be the most
important characteristic of an arbitrator since no partyis likely to be
satisfied with an arbitrator it perceives to be biased against its position.
There has even been some debate over whether disputants prefer arbitrators who
they perceive to be biased in their favor. On the one hand,such bias is
desirable because it suggests a higher probability of receiving a favorable
arbitration decision. But on the other hand, it damages the integrity of the
institution of arbitration and does not promote the legitimacy and mutual
acceptability of the arbitrator's award.
Consistency refers to the extent to which an arbitrator decides cases
solely on their merits, without reference to his (or her) "boxscore" of
previous decisions. The parties' concern with the consistencyof arbitrators
stems from their awareness that many arbitrators derive considerableincome
from arbitrating and therefore may have an incentive to "split their awards"in
order to appear impartial and maintain their acceptability. Such a practice
greatly threatens the institution of arbitration since it suggeststhat a-7-
certain fraction of cases will be won by a given party, not on theirmerits,
but simply because they are brought before an arbitrator.Consistency is most
often judged by subjectively reviewing an arbitrator's previous awardsto see
that similar decisions were reached in similar cases.
A third dimension along which arbitrators differ is theirtraining. Most
labor arbitrators are lawyers, undoubtedly because legaltraining is
well-suited to analyzing and judging the vast majority of labordisputes, i.e.,
disputes over the terms of existing contracts, also known as grievances.
However, the New Jersey system involves disputes over the terms of new
contracts, i.e., disputes oF interest, with the most common and important issue
in dispute being wages. Thus, one might expect thattraining in other areas,
and especially in economics, might be particularly desirable to theparties.
Arbitration experience is another important characteristic ofprospective
arbitrators. Practitioners generally regard this characteristicas a measure
of an individual's expertise as an arbitrator andusually insist upon an
experienced arbitrator in cases involving complex or otherwise difficult
issues. At a more theoretical level, it seems likely thatexperience -is
desirable because it reduces the uncertainty that risk-aversedisputants have
over the outcome of arbitration and thereby reduces its (indirect) cost.9
Indeed, the acquisition of experience is generally regarded to be the most
significant hurdle faced by aspiring labor arbitrators -in the U.S.1°
III. A Model of Arbitrator Selection
In this section we outline a simple model of arbitrator selection. We
start by considering a situation in which an employer (E) and a union (U)are
unable to reach agreement on a vector of contract items althoughthey do agree
(or are compelled by law) to have their dispute resolved by arbitration. A list
of seven potential arbitrators along with information on theirqualifications is—8-
circulated among the two parties by an impartial organization.Each party is
instructed to veto three names and rank the remaining four namesin order of
their preference. The individual who is not vetoed byeither side and who has
the lowest combined rank is appointed to hear the case;rank ties are broken by
coin tosses.1'
We now assume that each party has a preference orderingdefined over the
entire set of possible arbitration outcomes and that these preferenceorderings
can be represented by well-behaved Von Neumann-MorgenSterflutility functions.
We also assume that each party has one set of priorbeliefs about the
distribution of arbitration outcomes for each of the seven potential
arbitrators. Finally, we assume that these sets of prior beliefs dependon the
arbitrator's qualifications, some of which are observed.
In this model, an arbitrator's characteristics determine a party's prior
beliefs about the arbitrator's decision. These beliefs, in turn,determine the
expected utility that a party associates with thatarbitrator. It follows
that there exist direct mappings of arbitrator characteristicsinto an expected
utility for each party. For each potential arbitrator (1), wewrite these




(ib) Ui = + €U-i (i =1,2, .. ., 7)
where and are the expected utilities the employer and unionassociate
with arbitrator -i; X. is a vector of observed characteristicsof arbitrator 1;
and are vectors of unknown (reduced-form) parameterscharacterizing the
preferences of the employer and union for differentarbitrator characteristics;
and and €Ui represent random utility effects.
Given this framework, the simplest model one could adoptfor arbitrator-9-.
selection would treat each party as ranking arbitrators inorder of their
expected utilities. In other words, each party's statedranking is assumed to
coincide with the ordering of its true preferences. Morecomplicated models
which account for each party's incentives to rank arbitratorssome other way
are possible, too. For now, however, we shall work with thesimple model and
defer consideration of alternative models to SectionIV.C.
In order to make this model of arbitrator selectionempirically tractable,
it is necessary to treat the unobserved characteristics and eU (1= 1,
7) as random variables. We do this by assuming that these random
variables have independent extreme value distributions:
(2) Pr(€.x) =exp(—e) (p =E,U)
(1 =1, .. . , 7)
This distributional assumption is quite common in randomutility models of this
general form.12 It is also quite convenient, both analytically andcomputation-
ally, in the present application.
We derive the likelihood function for each party's rank choicesby
developing an expression for the probability of a particularranking. For
example, suppose the union ranked a list of seven arbitrators in thefollowing
order:(1, 2, 3, 4, Veto, Veto, Veto). The likelihood of thisranking is
simply the probability that >> "3>> ''5 Y). The
general formula for the probability of a particular ranking is givenby
K
(3) 11MNL(A(j) Remaining choice set, )
J=i
where A(j) denotes the arbitrator who receives the thrank, K is the number of
arbitrators that receive a rank (e.g., four, in the standardcase), and MNL is
the mult-inomial logit probability that aparty with preference parameterswill
most prefer arbitrator A(j) given the option of choosing from the8-j least pre--10-
ferred arbitratOrs. This probability is defined as
exP(XA,
(4) MNL(A(J) Remaining choice set, 13) =
exp(X
8—j
where qi8 refers to the remaining choice setof 8-j least preferred arbitrators.
The probability in equation (3) is simply the productof the multinomial
logit probabilities of ranking an arbitratorfrom among those arbitrators that
have not already been ranked. Notice that thismodel is extremely amenable to
dealing with the type of unbalanced data configurationwe face. For example,
in cases where more than four arbitrators are ranked,the likelihood of the
ranking will simply consist of the productof more than four multinomial logit
probabilities. Thus, this model makes efficient useof all of the preference
ordering information we have available. Itshould also be noted that this
likelihood function is globally concave. This property guaranteesa unique
maximum if the model is asymptotically identifiedand typically assures numeri—
cal stability in computing maximum likelihood estimates.
IV.EmpiricalResults
A. Descriptive Statistics
We begin our discussion of empirical results by presentinga descriptive
summary of the data. Table I presentsthe distribution, across arbitration
panels, of the number of arbitrators notvetoed by either side. If employer and
union preferences tend to be in direct conflict, onewould expect most panels to
yield only a single jointly-ranked arbitrator.Alternatively, if employer and
union preferences tend to be similar, one would expectmost panels to yield four
Jointly—ranked names. As the first row ofTable I makes clear, neither of
these extremes appears to be true. Over 80 percentof the panels yielded two
or three jointly acceptable arbitrators with an averageoverlap of nearly 2.5Table I
Percent Distribution of Number of Arbitrators
Not Vetoed by Either Party*
1 2 3 4 Average
A.All Cases(N=75) 9.3 44.0 37.4 9.3
Overlap
2.47
B.ArbitratedCases(N=29) 6.9 41.4 37.9 13.8 2.59
C.NegotiatedCases(N=46) 10.9 45.7 37.0 6.5 2.39
0.Independent Ranki 11.4
*These statistics, as well as those in Table II andFigure I, are based on the
75 cases in which both sides ranked four arbitratorsand vetoed three.—11—
arbitratorsper panel. Observe also thelast row of Table I that presents the
distribution of the number of jointly-ranked namesunder the assumption that
the parties' rankings of arbitrators are independentof each other. A
chi-square test comparing the observeddistribution (row A) to the
independent-rankings distribution (row 0) yields atest statistic of 11.2,
which is statistically significant at the .05 level (3 degreesof freedom).
This result suggests that the parties' rankings arenot independent. Moreover,
the biggest contribution to the test statistic comesfrom the proportion of
lists with 4 overlapping names, providing some evidenceof positive correlation
in the parties rankings. In addition, it is worth notingthat the distribution
of jointly-ranked names is not statistically significantlydifferent in the
subset of 29 cases that ended up being arbitratedthan in the subset of 46
cases that ended up being negotiated (i.e., a chi—squaretest for the equality
of the true distributions yields a test statisticof 1.4, which is not in the
5 percent tail of a x2 distribution with 3 degreesof freedom).
Since Table I is not informative about the closenessof employer and union
rankings within each panel of arbitrators, wehave computed a rank correlation
coefficient (p) for each of the 75 "perfect" cases
(5) p = REiRUj
—4
-i=1
where REj and are the ranks assigned by the employerand the union, respec-
tively, to the th arbitrator on thepanel.13 In Figure I we plot the
(observed) frequency distribution of thisstatistic. As can be seen from the
plot, there are some cases in which the parties'rankings are very different
(i.e., p-.5), some cases in which they are very similar (i.e., p .5), and
many cases in which they seem to beuncorrelated. However, on balance, the
plot seems to produce evidence of a slight tendencyfor the employer and union
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FigureI
Frequency Distribution of Rank Correlation Coefficient
Computed for Employer and Union Rankings—12—
We now take a closer look at the similarity of employer andunion
rankings by constructing a two-way contingency table ofthese rankings and for-
mall')' testing the hypothesis that they are independent.This contingency
table, which reports the number of times that arbitratorslisted on the 75
panels received each of twenty-five possible combinationsof employer and union
ranks, is presented in Table II. This table also presents (in parentheses)
theoretical frequencies for each cell computed under the hypothesis that the
rankings are independent.15 The hypothesis of independenceis tested using the
familiar x2 statistic which has the value 36.4 for this table. Since
this statistic has 15 degrees of freedom, we reject the hypothesis of
independence at all conventional significance levels (e.g., thecritical value
of a random variable at the 99 percent level is 32.8).
Before leaving Table II, it is interesting to note that the (1, 1) cell
makes the biggest contribution to the x2 statistic. In other words,the
hypothesis of independence is rejected largely because the unionsand the
employers ranked the same individual first -in 21 of the 75 panels they
reviewed. Indeed, the observed frequencies are greater than the theoretical
frequencies for all of the diagonal cells in Table II. This provides some
further evidence that employer and union preferences tend to be at least
moderately similar.
We now describe the characteristics of the New Jersey arbitrators. To
begin with, 45 percent of the arbitrators have law degreesand 12 percent are
Ph.D. economists; the remaining 43 percent are labor relations practitioners,
some of whom have Ph.D.ts in labor relations or other areas.All of the
arbitrators, of which there are only four women, have mediation or factfinding
experience in public sector wage disputes. In addition, two-thirdsof the
arbitrators had rendered at least one interest arbitration award in the NewTable II
Two-Way Distribution of Observed Employer and Union Rankings
(Theoretical frequencies are reported in parentheses)
Union
1 2 3 4 V Total
E
1 21 10 11 5 28 75
M (10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (32.1)
P 2 8 16 15 14 22 75
(10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (32.1)
L
3 7 12 14 7 35 75
0 (10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (32.1)
V 4 10 10 10 15 30 75
(10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (10.7) (32.1)
E
V 29 27 25 34 110 225
R (32.1) (32.1) (32.1) (32.1) (96.4)
Total 75 75 75 75 225 525—13—
Jersey system during its first two years of operation, although only12 percent
of the arbitrators had rendered five or more awards. On average, the New Jersey
arbitrators have about fifteen years of arbitration experience, with the range
of experience being from four years to forty years. Nearly two-thirds of the
arbitrators had been appointed to hear two or more grievance arbitration cases
in the New Jersey public sector in 1979. About one half of the arbitrators are
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
In Figure II we plot the average rankings received from the employers and
the unions by the 65 arbitrators who received at least two rankings from each
party.16 In computing these averages we were able to use ranking information
from most of the 193 panels by assigning vetoed arbitrators a rank equal to the
median of the unassigned ranks. As Figure II makes clear, there is considerable
dispersion across arbitrators in the average rankings they received from the
parties. This provides further evidence that the parties prefer some arbitra-
tors to others. Moreover, the average rankings in Figure II exhibit a fairly
high positive correlation (p =.51),providing a further indication of simi-
larity between the partiest preferences. Of course, one weakness of the
average-rank statistics plotted in Figure II is that they do not control for the
characteristics of the other arbitrators who appeared on the same lists.
However, controlling for those characteristics is accomplished by ourstructural
model of arbitrator selection, to which we now turn.
B. Estimation Results
Table III presents estimates of the employer and union preference
parameters of the random utility model in equation (1). Positive signed
coefficients indicate that a particular characteristic tends to increase the
expected utility of an arbitrator and, therefore, the likelihood that the
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FigureII
Average Rankings of Individual Arbitrators,
by Employers and Unions-14-
opposite. The estimates were obtained by maximizing the log of thelikelihood
function implied by equation (3) for a particular specification of arbitrator
characteristics. The maximization was accomplished on a personal computer
using the modified quadratic hill-climbing method (GRAOX) proposed byGoldfeld
and Quandt (1972). All of the rankings data available from the 193 arbitration
panels were used in the estimation (i.e., we used 129 employer rankingsand 160
union rankings). Since the estimates are maximum likelihood, standard tests of
their significance can be performed based on their asymptotic normality.
In specifying the vector of arbitrator characteristics, we paid close
attention to the institutional literature on arbitrator selection reviewed in
Section II. Thus, we attempted to capture the training dimension of an
arbitrator's characteristics by including dummy variables for lawyers and
economists,with all other arbitrators comprising the reference category. We
have no strong priors on the effect of these variables although it does seem
likely that economists would be viewed as best able to resolve the wage and
benefit disputes that are central to most negotiations in New Jersey. Our
specification also includes variables reflecting an arbitrator's experience.
Specifically, we include the number of grievance arbitration appointments each
arbitrator received in 1979 and the number of conventional and final-offer
arbitration awards each arbitrator rendered in New Jersey prior to 1980.17 If
experience is truly a desirable characteristic, we would expect both of these
measures, which are derived from independent arbitration systems, to be
positively associated with each parties' preferences for an arbitrator.
Finally, we attempt to control for an arbitrator's impartiality in several
ways. First, we include a variable (FAVU) defined to bethe difference between
the number of final—offer cases decided in favor of unions and the number decided
in favor of employers in the years 1978 and 1979. This variable is non—zero for—15—
about 55 percent of the arbitrators and takes on values between -4 and 4. If
this variable adequately measures the tendency of an arbitrator to be moresym-
pathetic to one side than the other, and if the parties prefer arbitrators they
perceive to be relatively sympathetic to their position, this variable should be
associated with more favorable rankings from the union and less favorable
rankings from the employer. Second, we construct a variable (FAVUHAT) which
measures the expected difference between the number of final offer cases decided
in favor of unions and employers. This measure is constructed using estimates
of the unconstrained arbitrator decision—making functions reported in
Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984, Table 2, columns 1 for 1978 and 1979) along with
information on the final offers in the 1978 and 1979 cases. The inclusion of
this variable in the empirical model refines the first measure of impartiality
by controlling for an important subset of facts in the final-offer cases. Thus,
under the assumption that the parties evaluate the record of each arbitrator's
final-offer decisions in light of the quality of the final offers they were
forced to choose between, our expectation is that the coefficient of FAVUHAT
will be opposite in sign but have the same absolute magnitude as the coefficient
of FAVU. Third, as a simple alternative measure of arbitrator bias, we include
a variable (AVEDEV) defined as the average wage increase awarded by each
arbitrator in their 1978 and 1979 cases. This variable, which incorporates
information from both conventional and final-offer cases, is expressed as a
deviation from the average of all awards rendered in 1978-79; it has the value
zero for arbitrators who made no awards. If case facts are similar across
bargaining disputes, this variable will provide a reasonable measure of each
arbitrator's tendency to favor the union or the employer.
The estimates in Table III reveal a number of interesting Features about





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the unionstend to prefer individuals with law degrees to labor relations
practitioners. However, employers prefer economists to both of thesegroups
whereas unions prefer both of these groups to economists. Perhaps this
somewhat surprising result is explained by the fact that economistsare likely
to be heavily influenced by efficiency considerations whereas lawyersare more
likely to place greater emphasis on equity.
Second, the three measures of an arbitrator's experience (GRAPTS79, NFOA,
and NTOT) typically have positive coefficients in both the employer and union
equations. This indicates that employers and unions both prefer more
experienced arbitrators to less experienced arbitrators, controlling for
variables reflecting their training and impartiality. It is, however,possible
to interpret the experience variables as controlling for arbitrator—specific
characteristics which are not in the model (akin to fixed effects) since, to
some extent, they reflect arbitrators' past popularity. Since it is not
possible for us to distinguish empirically between these alternative
interpretations of the experience variable, we conclude simply that our results
are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that experience is a desirable charac-
terist-ic, as emphasized in the institutional literature on arbitrator
selection.
Third, our measures of arbitrator bias, i.e., their past tendency to favor
unions, have negative coefficients in the employer equation and positive
coefficients in the union equation, whether or not we control for the case
facts. This indicates that employers tend to give poorer rankings to
arbitrators who seem to have favored unions in the past whereas unions tend to
prefer such arbitrators. This finding is consistent with our expectation that
the parties do not like arbitrators whom they perceive to be biased against
them. Note also that the coefficients of FAVUHAT are not significant at the—27—
five percent level -ineitherthe employer or the union equat-ions and that their
inclusion in the equations does not substantially change the magnitudes of the
coefficients of FAVU. In addition, in the employer equation the coefficient of
FAVUHAT is opposite in sign and of roughly the same magnitude as the
coefficient of FAVU. However, in the union equation the two coefficients have
the same sign and, counter to our expectation, we reject the hypothesis that
they sum to zero at the five percent level. Nonetheless, if we constrain the
coefficients of FAVU and FAVUHAT to be equal and opposite in sign (i.e., by
entering FAVOIFF), the measure of bias has the theoretically expected effect
and is close in magnitude to the bias coefficient in the other models.
The last point worth noting about the results in Table III relates to the
magnitudes of the coefficients. These are difficult to interpret since their
scale is determined by our assumption that the 6Ei and €Ui are drawn
independently from extreme value distributions as defined in equation (2).
However, one may gauge the magnitude of the coefficients by measuring their
values in relation to the standard deviation of the c's. The latter are fixed
by our distributional assumption and equal fl/V ( 1.28). Viewed in this way,
we see that all of the coefficient estimates are relatively small in magnitude.
For example, a one standard deviation change in the number of grievance
arbitration appointments only represents a change of about one-fourth of a
standard deviation of c. Thus, while our estimates of the effect of
arbitrators' characteristics on the parties' rankings are reasonably precise,
they are also quite small.18 Given the similarity of results from alternative
specifications (reported in Bloom and Cavanagh, 1985a) that allow for
nonlinearities and that include alternative measures of experience, we suspect
that the large amount of noise we are observing indicates that the parties are
relatively indifferent to many of the arbitrators in the New Jersey system.-18-
C. Testing for Strategic Behavior
As noted earlier, a critical assumption of our analysis is that the
observed rankings data reveal the true preferences of the parties. This would
'e true if each party perceived that it had no incentive to misstate itstrue
preferences. However, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which the
parties do have incentives to rank arbitrators strategically. For example,
suppose the union's true preference ranking of a list of seven arbitrators is
[1. 2, 3, 4, Veto, Veto, Veto] and the employer's true preference ranking is[1,
4, 3, 2, Veto, Veto, Veto]. Although not identical, these preferenceorderings
do have important similarities: they both rank the first arbitratoras most
preferred and they both veto the fifth, sixth, and seventh arbitrators.
However, if either party has some information about the other party's
preferences, it is quite likely that it will have an incentive to misstate its
true preferences. For example, if each party expects the other to veto the last
three arbitrators on the list, but has no idea how the otherparty will rank the
first four arbitrators, they will both try to ensure the appointment of the
first arbitrator by presenting identical rankings of [1, Veto, Veto,Veto] for
the first four arbitrators. Thus, the two parties' revealedpreferences might
appear quite similar even though the only correspondence between the true and
revealed preferences of each party would be the assignment of the most favorable
rank to the first arbitrator. Other examples, in which similarpreferences can
lead to dissimilar rankings, are possible, too. This type of behavior is
particularly distressing since it can lower both parties' welfare (see Bloom and
Cavanagh, 1985b). Moreover, it suggests that the estimates presented so far in
this section may not reflect the parties' true preferences.
A natural way to address this issue is to model the ranking of arbitrators
as a game in which each party must choose a strategy, i.e., a ranking, given—19-
itssubjective opinion about the ranking of the other party. Anatural
definition of equilibrium strategies for this game would be the BayesianNash
equilibrium which has the characteristic that neither party canincrease its
expected utility by unilaterally changing its strategy. In principle,one
could solve for each party's Nash strategy and derive a likelihoodfunction
that could be maximized to estimate each party's preference parameters
conditional on this strategic behavior. However, in practice, the
dimensionality of the problem makes this infeasible unless substantial
structure is placed on the problem, which we prefer not todo.19 Instead, we
will develop an empirical approach to this issue.
Our test for strategic behavior primarily involves the estimationof
alternative random utility models that use different subsets of information
available in the arbitrator rankings data. Under the null hypothesis thatthe
data reveal the parties' true preferences, estimates of the parametersof these
models should not be significantly different. We consider two alternative
models. First, we consider a model in which each party assigns a rank of one
to the arbitrator it truly prefers the most, but may rank the remainingsix
arbitrators strategically, i.e., not in the true order of their expected
utilities. The likelihood function for this model is derived from expressions
for the probability that A(1) >A(2)'A(3)' ''A(4)' ''A(Veto1)' 'A(Veto2)'
'A(Veto3) This is simply amultinomial logit model (MNL). Second, we
consider a model in which each party's ranking correctly distinguishes between
the four most preferred arbitrators and the three least preferred arbitrators,
although the ranking of the top four choices may be done strategically.The
likelihood function for this model -is derived from expressions for the
probability that A(1)' A(2)' A(3)' A(4) >A(Veto1)'A(Veto2)' A(Veto3*
This model shall be refer'red to as the rank/veto model (RV).20-20-
In Table IV we present estimates of the MNL model and the RV modelfor
specification (1) in Table III.If the rankings data do not reflect the true
preferences of the parties, then the three sets of estimates will ingeneral
have different probability limits, regardless of the trueunderlying model.
This suggests that a specification test based on the differencesbetween the
estimated parameter vectors has power against a broadrange of alternative
models in which the rankings do not reflect true preferences. Thistest should
be especially powerful against strategic behavior that isclosely approximated
by the MNL or the RV models.21 In constructing this test we follow Hausman
(1978) who suggests a statistic of the form
S =( - )'(V1 -V)(I -1311)
where the 13areestimated parameter vectors, the V are their estimated
variance-covarjance matrices, and the superscripts I and II index the alter-
native estimators. Hausman (1978) shows that, under the nullhypothesis, S is
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square random variable with degrees of
freedom equal to the rank of (V1 -Va).
CR MNL CR RV Test statistics for the hypotheses =13 and f3=f3are reported
in the last row of Table IV. Since the critical value for thesestatistics at
the 5 percent level is 11.07, none of the equality hypothesesare rejected with
the single exception of 13CR =13RVfor employers. Indeed, the closeness of the
parameter estimates in Tables III and IV is a remarkable finding that provides
strong evidence that the rankings data mainly reveal the parties! true
preferences. Even the two estimated parameter vectors that give rise to the
x2 statistic of 36.35 are close in magnitude andsubstantively no different.
The high x2 value appears to be the result of the two sets of estimateshaving
virtually identical estimated variances. In other words, the statistic
reflects a precise measure of a small difference; -it does not reflecta large—21—
difference between the estimated a's. Overall, then, the results of this
subsection provide no support for the hypothesis of strategic behavior by
either party.
V. Conclusions
This paper opens up the empirical analysis of a new area in the literature
on bargaining under arbitration: the selection of arbitrators. Our major
substantive findings are that (1) employers and unions distinctly prefer some
arbitrators to others, (2) employer and union preferences tend to be moderately
arbitrators with training




similar to each other; (3) employers tend to prefer
in economics whereas unions prefer arbitrators with
economists, (4) both parties prefer arbitrators with
there is evidence that the parties' preferences are
win—loss tallies under final—offer arbitration, and
that the parties rank arbitrators strategically.
Overall, the results suggest that New Jersey's prescreening procedure for
establishing its master list of arbitrators works well. Even after controlling
for the arbitrators' characteristics, there is much noise in the parties'
preference orderings. Nevertheless, it still seemsin the interest of the parties to
have input into the appointment of an arbitrator since our results indicate that
they have sensible preferences that they reveal accurately. Indeed,
appointment mechanisms that account for the parties' preferences tend toresult
in higher welfare for both parties than mechanisms that appoint arbitrators on
a rotating basis.
Of course, it has been argued that arbitration should be made costly so
that bargainers have an incentive to settle their disputes voluntarily (see
Stevens, 1966; Farber and Katz, 1979; Bloom, 1981). In this view, mechanisms
that allow disputants to choose their arbitrator are undesirable because theyTable IV
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Employer and Union Preference Functions,





LAWYER .386 .146 .088 .169
(.226) (.119) (.193) (.108)
ECONOMIST .669 .355 -.574 -.814
(.391) (.218) (.452) (.229)
6RAPTS79 .103 .082 .066 .076
(.025) (.014) (.022) (.013)
NFOA .090 .044 .012 .016
(.037) (.024) (.034) (.021)
FAVU —.098 —.073 .166 .072
(.057) (.034) (.058) (.033)
Log-likelihood —220.6 —405.6 -283.4 -472.2
x2(CRMNL
4.07 36.35 3.01 3.57
*Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses.—22—
reduce the (indirect) costs of arbitration. However, this negative factor must
be weighed against the increased legitimacy an arbitrator will have when the
parties have been involved in his (or her) appointment.
Our empirical results seem to indicate that the New Jersey mechanism for
selecting arbitrators works mainly as a safety net which allows the parties to
filter out the least acceptable arbitrators who survived the prescreening.
In other words, the extraordinary closeness of estimates derived from the
complete rankings and the rank/veto model suggests that most of the information
about the parties preferences comes from the vetoed arbitrators and not from the
rank order of the non-vetoed arbitrators. Indeed, it may well be true that
having seven arbitrators per panel is optimal given the degree of prescreening
that takes place and the nature of the parties' preferences.
Finally, the similarity of union and employer preferences for different
arbitrators suggests that collective bargaining functions more cooperatively
than most existing models indicate. This finding represents potentially
important input into the further development of models of employer-union
interactions.—23—
Footnotes
1. For some additional comparisons of arbitration and the court system, in
which the advantages of arbitration are stressed, see the text of Chief Justice
Burger's remarks to the American Arbitration Association and the Minnesota State
Bar Association (Burger, 1985).
2. See, especially, the work of Crawford (1979, 1982) and Farber (1979, 1980).
For a useful review of selected empirical analyses of some of the theoretical
issues raised -in these papers, see Ashenfelter (1985).
3. In many respects, the selection of an arbitrator is just one example of a
general class of social choice problems in which two or more economic agents
must collectively decide an intermediate or final outcome of some economic game.
Voting for public officials, reaching committee decisions, choosing real estate
appraisers (e.g., in cases of eminent domain), and determining the recipients
of different honors and awards are all examples. But the examples which are
most closely akin to the problem of selecting an arbitrator are the problems of
judge and jury selection. iflthecase of judges, prescreening is substantial
(e.g., all federal judges must be nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate), although assignments are random except for the practice of "forum
shopping" and of recusing in situations where there are conflicts of interest.
On the other hand, prescreening is minimal in the process of jury selection
since federal and state jury selection laws generally require that potential
jurors be "selected at random from a fair cross—section of the community (P.L.
90-274, 82 Stat. 53). However, jury selection procedures offer opportunities
to remove jurors both for cause and, although to a lesser extent, without
cause. These procedures, known as voir dire, are modeled in Roth, Kadane, and
DeGroot (1977).-24-
4.Detailed derivations of all of the likelihood functions we use and their
properties are presented in the Appendix to Bloom and Cavanagh, 1985a. This
paper is available from the authors on request.
5.PERC revises its master list of eligible arbitrators every three years.
6. This unbalanced data configuration complicates the descriptive presentation
of the data below. However, the econometric model developed in Section III is
ideally suited to this type of problem and makes efficient use of all available
information.
7. We relied particularly on material contained in MacDonald (1948) and
Elkouri and Elkouri (1985), and on conversations with Ben Fischer (former head
of the Arbitration Department of the United Steelworkers of America) and
Richard Reilly (Regional Director of the American Arbitration Association,
Boston Region).
8. The per diem that arbitrators charge is also a way in which they
differ. Most ad hoc arbitrators, for example, presently charge between two
hundred and six hundred dollars per day, plus expenses. Although little -is
known about the extent to which cost influences the selection of an arbitrator,
-it does drain the parties' funds and has been argued to be an important deter-
minant of the use of arbitration -in the case of financially small disputants
(see Bloom, 1981). In the New Jersey system under study, PERC establishes a
maximum per diem rate which is the rate charged by nearly all of the arbitra-
tors on the master list. As a result, there is very little variation in
arbitration fees across arbitrators. Thus, we do not include this variable in
our empirical analysis.
9. This conclusion requires the assumption that each party is equally risk
averse if negotiated outcomes are a possibility.
10. Recently, however, the high cost, long delays, and general shortage of—25-
experienced arbitrators have caused some individuals to question theimportance
of experience. For example, a system known as expedited arbitrationwas
adopted by labor and management in the basic steel industry in 1971. Under
th. system, unresolved employee grievances that do not require
precedent-setting rulings are arbitrated by a rotating panel of young,
inexperienced arbitrators (mostly lawyers) who decide the case for a relatively
small fee within two weeks of the decision to arbitrate. Although there has
yet to be an in-depth study of this system, its growing utilization in the
basic steel industry, in other United Steelworker contracts, in some United
Mineworker contracts, and in the U.S. Postal Service provides some evidence of
its success.
11. In this section we ignore the possibility that a voluntary settlementcan
occur after the appointment of an arbitrator but prior to arbitration.
12. See, for example, McFadden (1982).
13. If all arbitrators on the panel were assigned a rank between one andseven
by each party, p would always lie in the interval [-1.0, 1.0]. However,
because only four arbitrators of the seven listed on each panel receivea rank,
we were forced to assign a rank of 6.0 to the three vetoed arbitrators (i.e.,
the median of 5, 6, and 7). As a result, our estimates ofp must lie in the
interval [-.86, .93].
14. We have not worked out the distribution of p for the incomplete rankings
case. Thus, we are unable to construct a formal test.
15. For example, the expected number of arbitrators vetoed by the union and
ranked first by the employer is 32.1 (=3/7•1/7
•525).
16. Different arbitrators appeared on different numbers of panels because PERC
generated the panels randomly and because a number of arbitrators requested that
their names not be circulated actively throughout the entireyear.—26--
17. Final-offer arbitration is utilized to resolve aboutthree—fourths of the
bargaining disputes arising under the New Jersey statute.Under final—offer
arbitration the arbitrator is constrained to render an award which consistsof
one or the other of the bargainers' final positions. Mostof the remainder of
the New Jersey cases are resolved by conventional arbitration -inwhich the
arbitrator renders a decision which consists of his or her best judgmentof a
fair settlement and which may be a compromise between the parties'final offers.
For a more detailed description of the New Jersey statute see Bloom (1980).For
an analysis of arbitrator decision-making under thedifferent forms of
arbitration in New Jersey see Ashenfelter and Bloom (1983, 1984).
18. Nevertheless, the arbitrator characteristics included inthe model do have
significant explanatory power when considered jointly, as judged bythe
difference between the maximized log likelihood and the log likelihood
evaluated at =0.
19. In principle, each side has 840 distinct pure ranking strategies,of which
at least several hundred are undominated. Clearly, solving forthe Nash
equilibrium strategies in such a game is computationallyinfeasible (see Bloom
and Cavanagh, 1985b, for a description of equilibria in these and otherrelated
games).
20. It should be stressed that neither the MNL nor the RV modelis presumed
to be the correct structural model under strategic behavior.Both are,
however, reasonable approximations to structural models that strategicbehavior
is likely to imply. For example, even when behaving strategically, bargainers
are likely to give the top rank to one of their most preferredarbitrators. In
this case, the MNL model would be a reasonable approximation to the underlying
structural model. Alternatively, strategic behavior is unlikely to imply
vetoing one's most preferred arbitrators. In this case, the RVmodel would be—27-
a reasonable approximation.
21. In principle, the test also has power against a broadrange of other
specification errors relating to distributional assumption, functional form, and
independence of the errors.-28-
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1. The Econometric Model
In this appendix, we outline some of the main econometricresults
used in analyzing the rank—choice models of SectionIII.
Suppose each of T agents is faced with K options oralternatives.
For each alternative i, each agent has a (random) utilitywhich is a linear
function of the observed attributes of that alternative and someunobserved





where 1it is the utility agent t attaches to alternative i; is a vector of
observed attributes associated with alternative i and agent t;= (, •.•,
isa vector of unknown parameters characterizingthe tastes of the agents;
and representsthe utility effects of unobserved attributes.
By treating the unobserved attribute terms —— = i,...,K
t =1,...T——asrandom variables, the econometrician can view(A.l) as a
random utility model which can potentially be used todraw inferences con-
cerning the tastes (F, •' of the agents.
For our purposes, we suppose that the random variables have inde-
pendent extreme value distributions ——thatis,
—x
(xl=e_e for i =1,...,K t =1,...,T.
tIn multinomial choice models, this distributional assumptiongives rise to the
multi—noinial logit model. See, for example,McFadden (l9T). Theextreme——2—
value distribution is also computationally convenient for the rank—choice
models analyzed below.]
We consider the situation in which the econometrician observes, not
the actual values of the utilities each agent attaches to each alternative, but
the preference rankings of some of the alternatives by each of the agents.So,
we suppose that for each t the econometrician observes a vector of integers
••• whereRt(l) indicates which of the alternatives (1, ...,K)
the tth agent most prefers,Rt(2) is the second most preferred alternative
etc. and K Ejl,...,K}indicates how manyalternativeswe have rank infor-
mation on for agent t. We will consider three different procedures forusing
such data to estimate the parameters (8,,•••K•Before discussing the sta-
tistical methods, we introduce some additional notation. Let b =
(b1,••,





MNLt(ii, I..., i,b) =
s(i,h)
k= 1
Inthe multi—nomial logit literature, S.(b) isreferred to as the scale value
ofalternative iforagent twith parameters band MNLt -1 I1...., b)
isthemultinoriial logit probability that agent twithtaste parameters bwill
choosealternative i, when given the option of choosing amongst alternatives
...,
Method1. The simplest method for using the rank—choice data to estimate the
parameters=
(Ba,••' is simply to ignore all rankings except the top
ranking. The model then reduces to a multinomial logit model and inference can—3—
be based on the log.-likelihood function for the MNL model:
(A.2) L1(b) =logMNL(R(l) 1, ...,K;b).
t
Under suitable regularity conditions on the sequence of observed attributes,
the b which maximizes L1(b) will he a consistent and aymptotically normal esti-
mator of the true parameters .However,this estimator will not, in general,
be asymptotically efficient since it ignores information available in the addi-.
tional rankings ——R(2),
etc.
Method 2. The second method fully utilizes the information available in the
observedrankings. To calculate the likelihood function for the ranked data,
weneedto beableto calculate the probability that agent twith preference





> > •• > > allthe remaining
Thisproblem was addressed in Block and Marschak (1960) (see also Beggs,
Cardell and Hausman (1981)). They show that
(A.3)P ...,(K.t); h) =
Kt
flM1Lt(R(i)Iji, ••• K}{B(1), ...,Rt(i_l)};
b)
i=l
where Sdenotesset difference. That is, the probability of interest is simply_14
the product of the MNLprobabilitiesof choosing the 1th alternative given the
option of those alternatives that have notalready been chosen.
Usingthese calculations, we see that thelog—likelihood function
for the rank—choice data is given by
T
L2(b) = logMNL(R(i) I{i•..K}s{Rt(1), ...,Rt(i_1)};b). t=li=l
Asymptoticallyefficient statistical procedures can beconstructed using the
maximumlikelihood estimator based on this likelihoodfunction. Inference
based on L2(b) will, in general, be more efficientthat inference based on
L1(b). [Note also that L2 is globally concave ——thisguarantees a unique
maximum if the model is asymptotically identified
and typically assures numeri-
cal stability in calculating the MLE.]
Method 3.Theidea underlyingMethod 1 is that a likelihood function which
usesonly a part of the available data will yield inefficient butconsistent
estimators. In general, any informational garbling willyield consistent but
inefficientlimited information maximum likelihood estimators,so longas the
limitedinformation model is identified. Another limited informationmodel of
interest in this paper is one in which the exactrankings of each agent are not
recorded ——whatis recorded is the distinction between which alternativesare
among the agent'smost desirable options and which alternatives areamong
theK_Kt least desirable. Of course, in the special case in whichKt =1for
all t, this model is identical with the MNL model and Method3 simplifies to
Method 1. In general, this method bases inference on thelog—likelihood—5—
function
T
L3(b) = iog( Pt(a(Rt(l)), ...,o(R(K.));b)
t=l a
where the inner summation is over all permutationsa of the integers {R(l),
..., andthe funtion isdefined by (A.3). Hence, the summation
over a equals the probability that ... arethe top Kt choices of
agent t in any possible order.
Each of the three methods yields an estimatorwhich is consistent and
asymptotically normal under fairly general regularityconditions. However,
because methods 1 and 3 use only some ofthe information in the data they are
inefficient but they will yield consistentestimates of 8 under some cir-
cumstances in which the data are not trulygenerated by the del. For
example, if, for strategic reasons, agents
rankings correctly reflect their top
preferences but not this second, third,etc., then Method 1 will yield con-
sistent estimates of 8 but Methods 2 and 3will give inconsistent estimates.
Similarly, if agents reorder their xst preferredalteratives, then Method 3
will yield consistent estimates while 1and 2 will not.
In general, if the ranking data does notreflect the true preference
rankings of the agents then the threeestimators will have different probabi-
lity limits. These observations suggest
that specification tests based on the
differences between the Method 1 and 3estimators andtheMethod 2 estimator
will yield tests with power against abroad range of alternatives for which
the ranking data does not reflect preferencerankings.